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NARENJI V CIVILETTI: EXPEDIENCY TRIUMPHS
OVER ALIENS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
When the rule of law is being compromised by expediency in
many places in the world, it is crucial for our courts to make
certain that the United States does not retaliate in kind.'
On November 4, 1979, militant student demonstrators seized the
United States Embassy in Teheran, Iran, and took hostage approxi-
mately sixty-five American embassy employees. On November 10,
1979, President Carter, in response, directed the Attorney General to
"identify any Iranian Students in the United States who [were] not in
compliance with the terms of their entry visas, and to take the neces-
sary steps to commence deportation proceedings against those who
[had] violated the applicable immigration laws and regulations." 2 On
November 13, 1979, the Attorney General, acting pursuant to the presi-
dential directive, issued 8 Code of Federal Regulations section 214.5
directing Iranian nonimmigrant post-secondary students to report to
the Immigration and Naturalization Service by December 14, 1979,
with evidence of their residence and student status, including their
passport, a letter of good standing from their school, and evidence of
their current address. Failing to comply or willfully supplying false
information would subject such students to immediate deportation pro-
ceedings.3 The Attorney General took this action under the authority
1. Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 755 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Wright, C.J., Robinson,
Wald and Mikva, J.J., dissenting to denial of petition for rehearing en banc), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 957 (1980).
2. Announcements on Actions to be Taken by the Department of Justice, 15 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 2107 (Nov. 10, 1979).
3. 8 C.F.R. § 214.5 (1979) provides:
By virtue of the authority vested in me by 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) and 1184(a) and 8
U.S.C. 301, Part 214 of Chapter I Title 8, Code of Federal Regulations, is amended
by adding a new § 214.5 to read as follows: Requirements for maintenance of
status for nonimmigrant students from Iran.
(a) An alien ddmitted as an F-I or J-1 nonimmigrant student to attend a post-
secondary school, including a vocational school, who is a native or citizen of Iran
must report to the INS District Office or suboffice having jurisdiction over his or
her school or to an INS representative on campus before December 14, 1979, and
Srovide information as to residence and maintenance status. Each student must
ave in his or her possession at the time of reporting:
(I) Passport and Form 1-94;
(2) Evidence from the school of enrollment and payment of fees or waiver of
payment of fees for the current semester,
(3) A letter from school authorities attesting to the course hours in which
presently enrolled and the fact that the student is in good standing; and
(4) Evidence of current address in the United States. Students must provide
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that he claimed was accorded him by sections 1103(a) and 1184(a) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. 4
The regulation was challenged in United States District Court,
District of Columbia, in a class action5 brought on behalf of all nonim-
such information as INS may request in order to verify maintenance of status and
residence.
(b) Failure by a nonimmigrant student to comply with the provisions of para-
graph (a) of this section or willful provision of false information to the INS will be
considered a violation of the conditions of the nonimmigrant's stay in the United
States and will subject him or her to deportation proceedings under Section
241(a)(9) of the Act.
(c) A condition of the admission and continued stay in the United States of a
nonimmigrant covered by paragraph (a) of this section is obedience to all laws of
United States jurisdictions which prohibit the commission of crimes of violence
and for which a sentence of more than one year imprisonment may be imposed. A
nonimmigrant's conviction in a jurisdiction in the United States for a crime of
violence for which a sentence of more than one year imprisonment may be im-
posed (regardless of whether such sentence is in fact imposed) constitutes a failure
to maintain status under Section 241(a)(9) of the Act.
The foregoing actions are taken in accordance with the Presidential directive
of November 10, 1979, issued in the course of, and in response to, the international
crisis created by the unlawful detention of American citizens in the American Em-
bassy in Tehran. Accordingly, the notice and comment and delayed effective date
provisions of Section 553 of Title 5 of the United States Code are hereby waived as
impracticable and contrary to the public interest.
Effective date. The Amendments contained in this order become effective on No-
vember 13, 1979.
Dated: November 13, 1979.
Benjamin R. Civiletti,
Attorney General of the United States
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
The Attorney General shall be charged with the administration and enforcement
of this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of
aliens, except insofar as this chapter or such laws relate to the powers, functions,
and duties conferred upon the President, the Secretary of State, the officers of the
Department of State, or diplomatic or consular officers: Provided, however, That
determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of
law shall be controlling. He shall have control, direction, and supervision of all
employees and of all the files and records of the Service. He shall establish such
regulations; prescribe such forms of bond, reports, entries, and other papers; issue
such instructions; and perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying
out his authority under the provisions of this chapter. [Footnote omitted].
8 U.S.C. § 1184(a) (1976) provides:
The admission to the United States of any alien as a nonimmigrant shall be for
such time and under such conditions as the Attorney General may by regulations
prescribe, including when he deems necessary the giving of a bond with sufficient
surety in such sum and containin& such conditions as the Attorney General shall
prescribe, to insure that at the expiration of such time or upon failure to maintain
the status under which he was admitted, or to maintain any status subsequently
acquired under section 1258 of this title, such alien will depart from the United
States.
5. The cases of Narenji v. Civiletti, Civ. No. 79-3189 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 21, 1979), and
Confederation of Iranian Students v. Civiletti, Civ. No. 79-3210 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 27,
1979), were consolidated on November 27, 1979, under FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a), with a full
hearing on the merits held December 4, 1979.
NARENJI v. CIVILETTI
migrant students from the Islamic Republic of Iran.6 The plaintiffs
sought declaratory relief against Attorney General Benjamin R. Civi-
letti and Acting Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization
David Crosland on the grounds, inter alia, that the regulation, as
promulgated by the Attorney General, went beyond the authority over
immigration matters given the executive branch by Congress and by
the Constitution.7 The plaintiffs claimed that the regulation violated
the fifth amendment by discriminating against a distinct class on the
basis of national origin, that it violated the illegal search and seizure
provisions of the fourth amendment, and that it violated the first
amendment rights of Iranian students by chilling their rights to free
speech and assembly. The plaintiffs further alleged that the Govern-
ment had failed to comply with the notice and comment provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act,' that there was no statutory author-
ity for the regulation, and that the regulation was in violation of inter-
national law.9
On December 11, 1979, the district court entered judgment for the
plaintiffs and enjoined enforcement of the challenged regulation and
use of the information gathered in the course of the proceedings. The
district court found that: 1) the Immigration and Nationality Act sec-
tions 1103(a) and 1184(a) did not give the Attorney General the broad
authority necessary to issue a legislative-type regulation discriminating
against a select class of aliens on the basis of their nationality;"° 2) the
regulation was in violation of the equal protection component of the
fifth amendment because it created two distinct classes of nonimmi-
grant students, Iranians and non-Iranians, for purposes of law enforce-
ment;1' and 3) the regulation failed to satisfy the due process test for
federal regulations by not legitimately serving an overriding national
interest.'
2
6. Narenji v. Civiletti, 481 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980).
7. Id. at 1134.
8. According to the court, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1977) "requires that notice of a pro-
posed regulation and time for comment on its contents be afforded the public unless there is
an agency finding that good cause exists for waiver of the requirement because such a proce-
dure would be 'impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.' "Id. at 1137.
9. Id. at 1136. The plaintiffs prayed for an injunction against enforcement of the regu-
lation and for an injunction against deportation of any Iranian student who had reported to
the Immigration and Naturalization Service in compliance with the regulation. Id. at 1134.
10. Id. at 1141.
11. Id. at 1144.
12. Id. The court held that good cause existed for the Government's waiver of the no-
tice and comment provision of the Administrative Procedure Act 5 U.S.C. § 553. Id. at
1137. Because the court found 8 C.F.R. § 214.5 (1979) unconstitutional as a violation of the
1981]
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The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
judgment of the district court. 3 The court of appeals held that the At-
torney General was impliedly authorized to issue a regulation depriv-
ing a distinct class of nonimmigrant aliens of their fifth amendment
rights solely on the basis of their nationality because such a regulation
was "reasonably related" to his duties under the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act.14 The court further held that the Attorney General's reg-
ulation was not subject to constitutional challenge unless it was "wholly
irrational." In so holding, the court applied the test used to assess the
constitutionality of congressional enactments distinguishing among
aliens upon the basis of their nationality rather than the appropriate
test used to assess the constitutionality of federal regulations. The
court, however, declined to subject the regulation even to that narrow
standard on the ground that the issue concerned foreign policy judg-
ments of the executive branch, and thus presented a nonjusticiable
political question.15 The court, thereby, assumed that the Attorney
General's regulation was not "wholly irrational" and held that it did
not violate plaintiffs' right to equal protection of the laws under the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. 6
The court of appeals denied plaintiffs' petitions for rehearing and
suggestion of rehearing en banc,' 7 on January 31, 1980. On May 19,
1980, the Supreme Court denied plaintiffs' petition for writ of certio-
rari."'
Narenji raises serious questions: has either Congress or the Con-
stitution given the executive branch power to promulgate legislative-
type regulations which abridge the constitutional rights of lawfully ad-
fifth amendment it found it unnecessary to consider its validity under the first and fourth
amendments and under international law. Id. at 1147.
On December 14, 1979, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals granted the
defendants' motion to stay the district court's order enjoining the defendants from enforcing
the regulation or from using the information gathered in the course of its proceedings
against the Iranian students and ordered expedited consideration of the appeal. See also 8
C.F.R. § 214.5 (1979), as amended, extending the date by which Iranian students must re-
port to the INS to December 31, 1979.
13. Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980).
14. Id. at 747.
15. Id. at 747-48.
16. Id. The court of appeals declined to consider plaintiffs' first and fourth amendment
and international law challenges to the regulation's validity.
17. Id. at 750. Four of the judges dissented. Id. at 753-54. Chief Judge Wright, and
Judges Robinson, Wald and Mikva recognized both the seriousness of the equal protection
challenge and the significant question of the constitutional balance of powers raised by the
President's taking this action without express congressional authorization. Id. at 754, n.4.
18. 446 U.S. 957 (1980). Justice Brennan would have granted certiorari.
[Vol. 14
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mitted resident aliens on the basis of foreign policy; and, if that power
has been given the Executive, was the constitutionality of regulation
214.5 justiciable under the political question doctrine? In approaching
these questions, this note reviews the holding and rationale of both the
district and appellate courts and sets forth the rights accorded aliens by
the Constitution and the extent of Congress' power to abridge those
rights. This note next examines the substantive issues raised by
Narenji: 1) whether Congress delegated sufficient authority to the At-
torney General under the Immigration and Nationality Act to enable
him to promulgate regulation 214.5; and, if not, 2) whether the Presi-
dent's power over foreign affairs extends to immigration and, thereby,
gives him sufficient constitutional authority to order the regulation;
and, finally, 3) whether the constitutionality of the regulation was justi-
ciable under the political question doctrine.
Upon examining these issues, this note concludes that the regula-
tion, as promulgated by the Attorney General, was an unauthorized
encroachment by the executive branch over powers reserved exclu-
sively to Congress by the Constitution; and that the court of appeals, in
holding that Congress impliedly authorized the Attorney General to
issue a regulation discriminating against a group of aliens on the basis
of nationality, failed to subject the regulation to the appropriate consti-
tutional analysis.
I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ANALYSIS
The district court found that the regulation was not authorized by
Congress. The court noted that "Congress has been very explicit in
those instances when it desired that a particular group of aliens be
treated in a manner different from others." 19 The Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 has special provisions for aliens from Commu-
nist countries,20 denies immigrant visas to aliens from those countries
not accepting their own nationals who have been deported from the
United States,2 ' and excludes German Nazis from entry into the
United States.22 Furthermore, the Act expressly provides that "[n]o
person shall. . . be discriminated against in the issuance of an immi-
grant visa because of his. . . nationality. . . except as specifically pro-
vided in . . .this title ... -23
19. 481 F. Supp. at 1141.
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1970).
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(g) (1970).
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(33) (Supp. III 1980).
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a).
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The district court further noted that "in numerous other enact-
ments Congress has indicated its disdain for discrimination based on
national origin."'24 Congress has prohibited discrimination or segrega-
tion on the ground of race, color, religion or national origin in permit-
ting access to public accommodations, 25 to public facilities, 26 to public
education,2 7 to federally assisted programs, 28 and to employment op-
portunities.29 Congress has further sought to secure the individual lib-
erties of "all persons" within the jurisdiction of the United States by
providing a basis foir a civil action against any person, acting under
color of state law, who seeks to deprive another of his constitutional
rights.
30
In holding that sections 1103(a) and 1184(a) do not authorize the
Attorney General to issue a regulation discriminating against a select
group of aliens on the basis of their nationality, the district court also
pointed to the neutral wording of the statutes, which refer to "aliens"
but do not isolate any particular class or give the Attorney General
explicit authority to do so. The court cited the well-established princi-
ple that immigration and deportation statutes should be strictly con-
strued so as not to "'trench on [an alien's] freedom beyond that which
is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words
used.' ,,31
The court next looked to whether the Executive had any inherent
power over immigration. The court noted that although Congress is
primarily responsible for the regulation of immigration, "the executive,
by reason of the foreign affairs implications of any decision or action
24. 481 F. Supp. at 1141.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1976).
26. Id. at § 2000b.
27. Id. at § 2000c-6.
28. Id. at § 2000d.
29. Id. at § 2000e-2.
30. Id. at § 1983.
31. 481 F. Supp. at 1141 (citing Fong Han Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (holding
that 8 U.S.C. § 2155(a) (1970), which provides in part that ".. . any alien. . . who is here-
after sentenced more than once to imprisonment because of conviction in this country of any
crime involving moral turpitude ... shall, upon the warrant of the Attorney General, be
taken into custody and deported. . ... be strictly construed because "deportation is a drastic
measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile")). Accord, e.g., Lennon v. INS,
527 F.2d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1975) (an alien's conviction for possession of marijuana in viola-
tion of British law, under which knowledge of guilt was irrelevant, could not furnish
grounds for excluding him under a statute making excludable any alien convicted of any law
or regulation relating to the illicit possession of marijuana. In so holding, the court relied




affecting aliens, is not without authority in this area."3 2 But the court
rejected the defendant's argument that the Executive had inherent au-
thority to issue the regulation commensurate with that of Congress,
under its foreign affairs power.33
Because of its doubt as to the extent of executive power in the field
of immigration, the court proceeded on the assumption that the Execu-
tive did have sufficient authority to issue the regulation. The court next
considered the constitutionality of regulation 214.5 pursuant to the
equal protection component of the fifth amendment. The court ex-
amined the Supreme Court's decision in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong.
34
In Hampton, the Court held that in order for a federal regulation which
discriminates against aliens to be constitutional, there must be a legiti-
mate basis for presuming that the rule was intended to serve an "over-
riding national interest.
35
The district court in Narenji considered the interests which the
Government asserted were of sufficient import to justify the discrimina-
tory regulation: 1) the protection of the lives of the hostages held in
Iran by quelling potential domestic violence; 2) the need to express to
the government in Iran this country's displeasure with events in Tehe-
ran; and 3) the need to identify Iranian students to assist in the devel-
opment of appropriate responses to the crisis in Iran. The court
concluded that the only interest asserted by the Government which
could possibly justify the regulation was the need to protect the lives of
the hostages in Iran.36 Yet, the court found that there was no legitimate
basis for presuming that the rule was actually intended to serve that
interest, "there being at best a dubious relationship between the pres-
ence of Iranian students in this country, whether legally or otherwise,
and the safety and freedom of the hostages. 37
32. 481 F. Supp. at 1142-43.
33. The court weighed the need for Executive expediency in foreign affairs against the
constitutional limits of Executive authority and concluded that:
[t]o allow the executive to, in effect, delegate to itself the power to abrogate the
important, constitutionally protected right to equal protection of the laws under the
statutes governing immigration when Congress, which has primary responsibility
for the policy decisions m immigration matters, has not acted, exceeds the proper
boundaries within which the three branches of our constitutional government co-
exist.
Id. at 1143.
34. 426 U.S. 88 (1976). For further discussion of this case, see notes 131-35 infra and
accompanying text.
35. 426 U.S. at 103.
36. 481 F. Supp. at 1144.
37. Id. The court viewed the need to express American anger and the census-taking
interest as unjustifiable excuses for infringing upon the constitutional rights guaranteed
19811
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The Government had argued that the round-up of Iranian stu-
dents would help quell potential domestic violence against Iranians
that could lead to retaliatory measures against the hostages in Iran.
Yet, as the district court noted, the regulation could not be said to serve
that interest unless only those Iranian students who were in the United
States illegally would engage in provocative demonstrations.3" Fur-
thermore, the fear that Iranians might provoke domestic violence by
their very presence could not justify the regulation because only those
Iranians in the United States illegally would be expelled, leaving those
here legally as targets of violence. 39 The court concluded that the only
interest served by the regulation was the psychological "one of as-
suaging the anger of the American people by demonstrating that some-
thing is being done in the face of crisis."' 40  The court found that
although the regulation was an understandable effort to reply to the
actions taken against the United States in Iran, it did not support "a
legitimate national interest and therefore would not excuse the whole-
sale nullification of the rights of the students involved or save 8 C.F.R.
[section] 214.5 from violating the equal protection guarantee of the fifth
amendment.
41
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' ANALYSIS
The court of appeals reversed the district court's ruling. In so do-
ing, it held that Immigration and Nationality Act sections 1103(a),
1184(a) and 125 l(a)(9)42 plainly gave the Attorney General the author-
aliens. The court stated that the regulation violated the fundamental principles of American
fairness because political and economic retaliatory measures were available to the govern-
ment. Md.
38. Id. The district court recognized the question of the first amendment right to free
speech which this argument raised. Although the court found it unnecessary to rule on this
question, the plaintiffs offered a persuasive analysis of the issue, stating that: "[g]overnment
is not free to restrict the rights of individuals even to engage in provocative demonstrations
because of its fear of the bruised sensibilities or violent reactions of other segments of the
population." Brief for Petitioner at 33, Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 755 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980). See, e.g., Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969)
(when petitioners were engaged in an orderly demonstration, police could not violate their
first amendment rights by ordering them to disperse on grounds that onlookers were becom-
ing violent); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971) (a city ordinance which violated
the constitutional right of free assembly and association could not be upheld on the basis of
public intolerance or animosity).
39. 481 F. Supp. at 1144.
40. .1d. at 1144-45.
41. Id. at 1145.
42. 8 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(9) (1970) authorizes the Attorney General to order the deporta-
"tion of any nonimmigrant alien who fails to maintain his nonimmigrant status or to comply
with the conditions of such status.
Vol. 14
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ity to promulgate regulation 214.5.41 The court reasoned that "[tihe
statute need not specifically authorize each and every action taken by
the Attorney General, so long as his action is reasonably related to the
duties imposed upon him."'  The court continued that because the Act
specifically authorizes the Attorney General "to prescribe special regu-
lations and forms for the registration and fingerprinting of. . . (5)
aliens of any other class not lawfully admitted to the United States for
permanent residence,"45 and because the failure to maintain nonimmi-
grant status or to comply with the conditions of such status is a ground
for deportation,46 the Attorney General's promulgation of a regulation
distinguishing among aliens on the basis of nationality for the purpose
of selective law enforcement was "directly and reasonably related to
• . . [his] duties and authority under the Act."47
After finding that regulation 214.5 was authorized by statute, the
court of appeals undertook the determination of the constitutionality of
the regulations. Instead of relying upon the "legitimate basis" test for
measuring the constitutionality offederal immigration regulations as set
forth in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,48 the court of appeals relied upon
two cases dealing with judicial review of congressional enactments in
the field of immigration.49 Under these cases, the federal judiciary can
invalidate federal immigration legislation only if it is found to be
"wholly irrational."5
The court, however, failed to apply even this "toothless" standard
of review to the Attorney General's regulation. Instead, it concluded
that the Iranian student controversy presented a political question.5 '
According to the court of appeals, the issues presented involved the
field of foreign affairs and implicated matters over which the President
has direct constitutional authority. The court cited the Attorney Gen-
43. 617 F.2d at 747.
44. Id.
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1970).
46. Id. at § 1251(a)(9) (1970).
47. 617 F.2d at 747.
48. 426 U.S. 88 (1976). See notes 34-35 supra, notes 131-35 infra, and accompanying
text for further discussion of the test set forth in Hampton.
49. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); 617 F.2d at 747 (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787 (1977)). In Fallo, the Court had held constitutional a congressional enactment which
excluded fathers of illegitimate children who had since become United States citizens, from
qualifying for special preference under the immigration laws. In Mathews, the Court had
held constitutional a congressional act which conditioned aliens' eligibility for medicare
benefits on the character and duration of their residence within the United States. For fur-
ther discussion of this case, see notes 84-85, 123-26 infra and accompanying text.
50. 426 U.S. at 81-83; 430 U.S. at 791.
51. 617 F.2d at 748.
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eral's affidavit which defended the regulation as an "element of the lan-
guage of diplomacy by which international courtesies are granted or
withdrawn," and maintained that "[t]he action implemented by these
regulations is therefore a fundamental element of the President's efforts
to resolve the Iranian crisis and to maintain the safety of the American
hostages in Teheran."52 The court further supported its conclusion by
noting that the Iranian government's refusal to intercede in the taking
of the hostages was in violation of the United States and Iran's Amity
Treaty,53 and that the Iranian action had been held to be in violation of
international law by the World Court.5 4 Thus, the court did not apply
the "wholly irrational" test to the regulation, but concluded that "in a
case such as the one presented here it is not the business of courts to




The gravity of the problems presented by the court of appeals'
analysis in Narenji, can be better appreciated by briefly examining the
rights accorded aliens under the Constitution, and the extent of the
power given Congress to abridge those rights.
A. Aliens' Rights Under the Constitution
The Narenji court of appeals did not seem to consider the protec-
tions accorded aliens by the Constitution. Yet, the Constitution seldom
differentiates between aliens and citizens, extending its protection
broadly to all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States. The
protections of the fifth amendment (presentment or indictment, double
jeopardy, self-incrimination, due process, compensation for taking of
property) apply to any "person," as do the guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment (due process, equal protection). The fourth amendment
(unreasonable search and seizure) applies, as well, to all "persons."
The first amendment (freedom of religion, speech and press, right to
assemble and to petition the government) guarantees protection to "the
people." The sixth amendment secures rights of "the accused" in crim-
inal proceedings. The eighth amendment speaks in general terms ex-
tending protection against excessive bail or fines, or cruel or unusual
punishments. Finally, the ninth and tenth amendments reserve for
52. Id. at 747-48.
53. 284 U.N.T.S. 93 (1957-58); T.I.A.S. No. 3853.




"the people" rights not enumerated nor specifically delegated in the
Constitution. 6 Furthermore, that the Constitution does differentiate
between citizens and aliens in specific instances supports the conclusion
that, except in these instances, aliens are entitled to the same constitu-
tional protections as are citizens.57
The Supreme Court has affirmed the rights accorded aliens, hold-
ing that "all persons" within the territory of the United States or sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the United States are entitled to constitutional
protection.5 8 Thus, the Court has acknowledged that aliens are entitled
to equal economic opportunity and to equal protection of the laws
under the fifth amendment,59 to the protection of the fifth and sixth
amendments in criminal proceedings,60 to the protection of the fifth
amendment's prohibition against the taking of property without just
compensation,61 to invoke the writ of habeas corpus to protect their
personal liberty,62 to procedural due process of law in deportation pro-
ceedings, 63 to access to federal64 and state courts, 65 and to equal protec-
tion of the laws under the fourteenth amendment.66 The federal courts
also have held that aliens are afforded the protection against unlawful
search and seizure under the fourth amendment.67 The court of ap-
peals inNarenji failed to recognize the importance of the rights guaran-
56. Gordon, THE ALIEN AND THE CONSTrrUTION, 9 CAL W. L. REV. 1, 2 (1972) [herein-
after cited as Gordon].
57. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1 requires that the President be a native of the United States;
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 requires that members of the House of Representatives be citizens;
U.S. Co ST. art. I, § 3 mandates that any Senator be a citizen. U.S. CONST. amends. XV,
XIX and XXVI protect the right of "citizens" to vote; and the privileges and immunities
clauses of U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2 and amend. XIV § 1 extend only to citizens. Gordon,
supra note 56, at 1.
58. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1922).
59. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) ("It]he Fifth Amendment, as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment, protects every [alien] from deprivation of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. . . . Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, in-
voluntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection.")(citations omitted). See
also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
60. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
61. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228 (1942); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United
States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931).
62. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
63. Id.
64. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892).
65. Exparte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69 (1942).
66. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
67. Cheung Tin Wong v. INS, 468 F.2d 1123, 1126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Yam Sung Kwai
v. INS, 411 F.2d 683, 686 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 877 (1969). See also Gordon,
supra note 56, at 13-20; 1 C. ANTI U, MODERN CONSTrTONAL LAw § 9:25, at 713-20,
725-26 (1969).
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teed aliens by the Constitution and focused, instead, on the
constitutional power accorded Congress to abridge these rights.
B. Power of Congress Over Immigration
The Constitution states that "the Congress shall have Power to
...establish a Uniform Rule of Naturalization. ' 68 While recognizing
that the Constitution does extend to aliens many of the same protec-
tions accorded to citizens,69 the Supreme Court has also recognized the
extensive power of Congress over matters concerning immigration.
The Court has upheld many statutes which would be unconstitutional
if applied to citizens.70 Examples of the broad extent of congressional
power over immigration can be seen in the Supreme Court's decisions
holding that Congress has the power to prohibit a distinct national
group from entering the United States,71 to deport alien residents of
long standing on the basis of their past membership in the Communist
Party,72 to exclude an avowed Marxist from temporary entry into the
United States even where the abridgement of citizens' first amendment
rights is at issue, 7 and to condition aliens' eligibility for benefits ex-
tended to citizens on the duration of their residency within the United
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
69. See notes 56-67 supra and accompanying text.
70. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976).
71. Chae Chang Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 1581
(1888). In this early decision, the Court upheld the validity of the Chinese Exclusion laws
which excluded Chinese nationals from entry, or from reentry with a certificate of permis-
sion to return, into the United States. These laws were finally repealed by Congress in 1943.
(Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600-01.) For another example of the discriminatory
laws enacted by Congress and upheld by the Court during this unfortunate phase of Ameri-
can history, see Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), in which the Court
held that Congress' right to exclude or expel aliens is absolute and vested in it by the Consti-
tution.
72. Congress enacted the Internal Security Act of 1950, Section 22, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781, 785
(1951), to provide for the deportation of any alien within the United States who was, or ever
had been, a member of the Communist party. In Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954), the
Court sustained the constitutionality of the statute and allowed the INS to deport an alien
who had been a past member of the Communist party and who had resided in the United
States for thirty-six years. See also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1951), in which
the Court upheld the deportation of alien residents of long standing for their past member-
ship in the Communist Party. Their deportation was based on a provision of the Alien
Registration Act, 8 U.S.C. § 137 (1940), which required deportation of any alien who was
either at the time of entering the United States, or "at any time thereafter," a member of an
organization advocating the unlawful overthrow of the United States government.
73. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). In Kleindenst, the Court held that Con-
gress' power to exclude classes of aliens with particular political beliefs was so great that it
could not be challenged by United States citizens who claimed a first amendment right to
associate with and to receive thoughts and ideas from an alien.
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States.74
Judicial review of congressional enactments in the area of immi-
gration is indeed limited. The most recent test for determining whether
a federal statute unconstitutionally infringes upon an alien's rights was
enunciated in Mathews v. Diaz.75 In Mathews, the Supreme Court
found that a statute conditioning an alien's eligibility for medicare ben-
efits upon duration of residency within the United States was not
"wholly irrational" and was, therefore, constitutional.76 The Court
found that the policy considerations underlying the statute were "rea-
sonable, ' 77 and stated that if it were to find otherwise, it would merely
be supplanting its own judgment for that of Congress. Such a determi-
nation, the Court held, would exceed the proper role of the federal ju-
diciary.
78
Congress, alone, acting under the authority over immigration
vested in it by the Constitution, has the power to restrict aliens' rights.
7 9
However, despite the fact that it possesses the power to create alienage
classifications based upon nationality, Congress has seen fit to do so
only in a few instances.80 Congress, like the Court, has recognized that
distinctions based on national origin are "odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."81 It is for this
74. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). See notes 75-78 infra and accompanying text.
75. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
76. Id. at 83. It should be noted that Mathews involved the question of whether "bene-
fits" afforded a class of citizens should also be afforded a respective class of aliens. The
Court made clear that the issue was not a deprivation of substantive constitutional rights, but,
rather, whether all aliens were entitled to the same benefts under government programs as
were citizens. Id. at 80, 82-83. It is uncertain, therefore, whether the Court would limit its
analysis to the narrow "wholly irrational" test if confronted with a statute abridging sub-
stantive rights conferred upon aliens by the Constitution.
77. The Mathews Court stated that "it is unquestionably reasonable for Congress to
make an alien's eligibility [for medicare benefits] depend on both the character and duration
of his residence." The Court reasoned that a line separating those who receive benefits and
those who do not must be drawn somewhere, and it is Congress, not the courts, who must
make this determination. Id. at 83.
78. Id. at 84.
79. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1953). See also Harisiadcs v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. at 586-87, discussed supra at note 72.
80. See note 19-23 supra and accompanying text. Evidence of Congress' distaste for
distinctions drawn on the basis of nationality is also found in its abandonment of the na-
tional origin and quota system of immigration. See notes 92-93 infra and accompanying
text.
81. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (upholding the constitutional-
ity of war-time Executive orders, ratified by Congress, imposing curfew for American citi-
zens of Japanese descent). See also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
(sustaining a war-time order given by the Commanding General of the Western Command,
United States Army, which directed that all persons of Japanese ancestry should be ex-
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reason that classifications based on nationality are generally considered
suspect and are subject to close judicial scrutiny. They rarely support
even a legitimate, much less the requisite "compelling," governmental
interest.82 None of the cases on which the court of appeals in Narenji
relied upon to support Congress' power to discriminate against Iranian
nationals involved classifications based upon nationality. 83 For exam-
ple, in Mathews,84 the Supreme Court recognized that while the federal
law denying Medicare benefits to all aliens who had not lived in the
United States for at least five years could have a particularly adverse
impact on refugees from Cuba, who were at that time immigrating to
the United States in large numbers, the law at least did not have the
undesirable characteristic of facially distinguishing between aliens on
the basis of nationality.85 As shown in the ensuing section, congres-
sional reticence to enact laws on this basis makes untenable the court of
appeals' conclusion that Congress impliedly delegated to the Attorney
General authority to promulgate a regulation discriminating against a
select group of aliens on the basis of nationality.
C. Congressional Delegation of Power to the Attorney General-
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
Recognizing that the federal government's power to abridge the
constitutional rights of lawfully admitted resident aliens rests exclu-
sively with Congress, the Attorney General based his authority to pro-
mulgate regulation 214.5 on sections 1103(a) and 1184(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, rather than on the directive
issued by the President.86 There is serious doubt, however, as to
whether the Act in fact gave the Attorney General the power to pro-
mulgate the regulation in question.
cluded from a military area). In both cases, the Court looked to the inherently suspect char-
acter of any legal restrictions based on national origin, but held that in time of war, pressing
public necessity could sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions. But see notes 92-
93 infra and accompanying text.
82. 320 U.S. at 100.
83. In Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), the Court upheld a congressional enactment
which excluded fathers of illegitimate children who had since become United States citizens
from qualifying for special preference under the immigration laws; in Harisiades v. Shaugh-
nessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1951), the Court sustained the constitutionality of a statute distinguish-
ing between aliens on the basis of their affiliation with the Communist Party.
84. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
85. Id. at 77-84.
86. 8 C.F.R. § 214.5 (1979) reads in pertinent part: "By virtue of the authority vested in
me by 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) and 1184(a) and 8 U.S.C. 301, Part 214 of Title 8, Code of Federal
Regulations, is amended by adding a new § 214.5. .. "
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In Kent v. Dulles,87 the Supreme Court established the principle
that administrative powers should not be construed to give the ad-
ministering authority the power to infringe upon individual rights in
the absence of a clear indication that Congress intended to confer such
authority. Application of this test to sections 1103(a) and 1184(a) con-
firms the conclusion that Congress intended to retain sole responsibility
for substantive legislation in the area of immigration.
Section 1103(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
charges the Attorney General with the administration and enforcement
of the Act and all other immigration laws. This section does allow the
Attorney General discretion, but solely in procedural matters. 8
Section 1184(a) provides that the Attorney General may establish
the "conditions" for the admission of aliens to the United States.89 Ac-
cordingly, the Attorney General's authority under this section has been
limited to such procedural conditions as the time for which an immi-
grant initially may be admitted, extensions of stay, filing fees, and the
form and content of applications and papers. 90
Neither of these statutes implies, much less clearly indicates, that
87. 357 U.S. 116 (1958). In Kent, the Secretary of State refused to issue passports to the
two plaintiffs because of their refusal to sign an affidavit concerning their membership in the
Communist Party. The Secretary of State based his authority to deny issuance of the pass-
ports on section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1970),
and on section 1 of the Act of Congress of 1926, 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1979). In determining
the scope of authority given the Secretary of State by the Act of 1952 the Court looked to
congressional intent. The Court found that Congress had considered the prior policy of
limited restraints in issuing passports before enacting the statute which gave the Secretary of
State this discretionary power, and declined to impute to Congress the purpose of giving the
Secretary of State unbridled authority to grant or withhold a passport. Id. at 127-28. The
Court held that an explicit statement by Congress is required to curtail a citizen's constitu-
tional rights. Id. at 130. There is no basis for assuming that the Court would adopt any
lesser standard for construing statutes affecting aliens. See notes 56-67 supra and accompa-
nying text.
88. Section 1103(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)
(1970), provides in pertinent part:
The Attorney General shall be charged with the administration and enforcement of
this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of
aliens. . . . He shall establish such regulations; prescribe such forms of bond, re-
ports, entries, and other papers; issue such instructions; and perform such other
acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of
this chapter. . . (footnote deleted).
(emphasis added).
89. Section 1184(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
The admission to the United States of any alien as a nonimmigrant shall be for
such time and under such conditions as the Attorney General may by regulations
prescribe. ...
(emphasis added).
90. See regulationspassim at 8 C.F.R. § 214 (1979).
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the Attorney General has the power to draw substantive classifications
infringing upon individual rights. The court of appeals' ruling both
ignores the Supreme Court's "clear statement" requirement and en-
ables the Attorney General to assume a legislative function on the basis
of neutrally worded statutes which merely give him authority to admin-
ister a federal agency in accordance with federal law.
It is also true that the court of appeals' holding undermines Con-
gress' recent efforts to eliminate such nationality-based classifications.
In the 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, Con-
gress eliminated the national origin and quota system of immigration"
and replaced it with a new system of selection based on classifications
other than nationality.92 Congress' stated purpose in repealing the na-
tional origin and quota system was to replace it with a new system of
selection which would be "fair, rational, humane, and in the national
interest."93
In light of Congress' intentional abandonment of a system of clas-
sification based on national origin, the Attorney General's claim that
sections 1103(a) and 1184(a) impliedly give him power to authorize
special regulations on this disfavored basis is highly tenuous. If Con-
gress has given the Attorney General this broad authority, it has aforti-
ori authorized him to re-create the very national origin and quota
system which it has chosen to eliminate. 4 Such a construction of the
statute, is contrary to clear congressional intent, and clearly improper.
95
91. S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprintedin [1965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3328-29.
92. Id. at 3331. The national origin and quota system established quotas for each quota
area based upon a percentage of the alien population in the United States attributable to
each quota area. Quota areas embraced all areas of the world, other than the independent
countries of the Western Hemisphere. Each area had assigned quotas to which natives of
those areas had access regardless of race, with the exception of the Asia-Pacific triangle.
[Tihe formula for establishing the quota of each quota area was reduced to a fixed
mathematical ratio of one-sixth of 1 percent of the inhabitants of the United States
in 1920 attributable by national origin to each area, with a guarantee of a mini-
mum of 100 to each quota area.
Id.
93. Id. at 3332.
94. Brief for Petitioner at 8-9, Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980).
95. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1951), a case dealing
with a presidential enactment which was promulgated without congressional approval and
without regard to specific congressional legislation directed toward the same contingency.
Justice Frankfurter commented:
It is one thing to draw an intention of Congress from general language and to say
that Congress would have explicitly written what is inferred, where Congress has
not addressed itself to a specific situation. It is quite impossible, however, when
Congress did specifically address itself to a problem, as Congress did. . .[here], to
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The court of appeals attempted to bolster its holding that Immi-
gration and Nationality Act sections 1103(a) and 1184(a) "plainly en-
compass authority to promulgate regulation 214.5" 96 by citing section
1393(a) of the same statute. This section authorizes the Attorney Gen-
eral "to prescribe special regulations and forms for the registration and
fingerprinting of. . . (5) aliens of any other class not lawfully admitted
to the United States for permanent residence." '97 The court also relied
on section 1251(a)(9), which authorizes the Attorney General to order
the deportation of any nonimmigrant alien who fails to maintain his
nonimmigrant status or to comply with the conditions of such status.98
This argument, however, fails in light of the Supreme Court's earlier
ruling that any immigration statute which carries the penalty of depor-
tation must be construed in favor of the alien.99
It is quite clear that Congress did not give the Attorney General
authority to abridge aliens' rights through classifications based upon
nationality; the court of appeals' contrary conclusion is simply unper-
suasive. The only other source from which the Attorney General might
possibly have derived power to issue the regulation is from the Execu-
tive, himself. An analysis of Narenji, therefore, requires a determina-
tion of whether the Executive's power over foreign affairs extends to
matters of immigration and gives him authority commensurate with
that of Congress to promulgate legislation which discriminates against
aliens on the basis of nationality.
D. Limitations on Executive Power Over Foreign Affairs
There is no doubt that the Executive has extraordinary power over
this country's foreign affairs. The President alone has the power to
speak or to listen as a representative of the nation. The President is the
sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and is its sole represen-
tative with foreign nations. l°°
The court of appeals in Nareni cited United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp. ,1o to illustrate both the extent of this power and
find secreted in the interstices of legislation the very grant of power which Con-
gress consciously withheld.
Id. at 609 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
96. 617 F.2d at 747.
97. 8 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
98. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(9) (1976).
99. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
100. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936).
101. 617 F.2d at 748 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at
320).
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the degree of flexibility required by the President in its use. In Curtiss-
Wright, the Supreme Court considered whether a joint resolution of
Congress, specifically delegating to the President legislative-type power
to curtail the sale of weapons by private munitions dealers within the
United States to a war zone in the Chaco, amounted to an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative power. In upholding the resolution, the
Court discussed the scope of the President's power in the field of for-
eign affairs, and stated that "congressional legislation which is to be
made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international
field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and free-
dom . ... I' In the presidential proclamation at issue in Curtiss-
Wright, the President himself had acknowledged that, although his
constitutional power over foreign affairs was great, legislative action
was required in order to curtail the rights of those subject to the juris-
diction of the United States.103
The Supreme Court has also recognized this limitation on the Ex-
ecutive's power over foreign affairs, and has been adamant in refusing
to uphold presidential enactments when their effect will be to violate
substantive constitutional rights. This has been true even when the
President was acting to further national security interests.1°4 As the
Court warned in Curtiss- Wright, the President's authority over foreign
affairs must be "exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions
of the Constitution." °105 A number of cases illustrate the Court's serious
appraisal of the conflict between the need for executive expediency in
foreign affairs and the need to protect individual rights.
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. United States,0 6 the Court
recognized both the power of the Executive as Commander in Chief of
the armed forces during wartime and the seriousness of the national
security interests at stake. Yet the Court held that the Executive's
102. 299 U.S. at 320 (emphasis added).
103. The President's proclamation stated: "Now, therefore, I, Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority con-
ferred in me by the saidjoint resolution of Congress. . . ." Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
104. See notes 106-14 infra and accompanying text.
105. 299 U.S. at 320. Accord, Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1957) (the Executive
could not nullify the right of the American wife of an American military officer stationed
overseas to a trial by jury).
106. 343 U.S. 579 (1951). In Youngstown, the Court considered the validity of an Execu-
tive order, given without Congressional authorization, directing the Secretary of Commerce
to take possession of and to operate steel mills throughout the United States during a nation-
wide steel industry strike. The President contended that his action was necessary to avert a
national catastrophe because a work stoppage would immediately imperil the national de-
fense when the American armed forces were fighting in Korea.
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power over foreign affairs did not give him the power temporarily to
seize private property within the United States. Four of the concurring
justices, however, limited their concurrence to instances wherein the
President had attempted to use his emergency powers to override ex-
isting congressional legislation designed to deal with the same emer-
gency.10 7 It was on this basis that Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, Burton
and Clark determined that President Truman had stepped beyond the
proper bounds of the constitutionally mandated balance of powers sep-
arating the executive and legislative branches of government. Yet, Jus-
tice Jackson went beyond this limited fact situation and stated that
"[w]here the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed
or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he
can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitu-
tional powers of Congress over the matter."' 0 8 Thus, Narenji falls
within the ambit of cases wherein presidential authority is weakest due
to the recent congressional measures designed to eliminate nationality-
based classifications in the area of immigration. 10 9
In Youngstown, the encroachment by the executive branch upon
legislative authority was clear because there was existing legislation
designed to meet the very emergency confronting the President."10
Congress had thus expressly rejected the idea of giving the President
the very power he claimed. However, the majority opinion, and two of
the concurring opinions, took the position that the President, even
when national security interests are at stake, and even when Congress
107. Id. at 609 (Frankfurter, ., concurring), 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring), 660 (Bur-
ton, J., concurring). See also the concurring opinion of Justice Clark which states "that in
the absence of such action by Congress, the President's independent power to act depends
upon the gravity of the situation confronting the nation." Id. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 637 (emphasis added).
109. See notes 93-94 supra and accompanying text. Justice Jackson also suggested that
the President could never use his emergency powers or his powers as Commander in Chief
of the armed forces to assume a legislative function. 343 U.S. at 644-50 (Jackson, J., concur-
ring). Justice Jackson noted that the Constitution had limited its express grant of presiden-
tial emergency authority to the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in time of rebellion
or invasion and concluded that the Constitution could not be amended by the courts to
confer upon the President inherent powers to meet an emergency. Id. at 650. Justice Jack-
son reasoned that Congress' power to enact legislation to deal with emergencies precluded
the Executive from investing himself with undefined emergency powers. His conclusion
seems particularly apt to Narenji:
The Executive, except for recommendation and veto, has no legislative power. The
executive action we have here originates in the individual will of the President and
represents an exercise of authority without law. No one, perhaps not even the
President, knows the limits of the power he may seek to assert in this instance and
the parties affected cannot learn the limits of their rights.
Id. at 655.
110. Id. at 585-86.
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has not yet acted upon the issue in question, is still without the power
to make laws on his own.'
In New York Times Co. v. United States,"I2 the Court reaffirmed
the principle that the Executive's authority over foreign affairs must be
exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitu-
tion. In New York Times, the President sought a federal court injunc-
tion against publication of a classified study entitled "History of U.S.
Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy," popularly known as
the Pentagon Papers. The President based his authority to seek such an
injunction on the power given him by the Constitution over foreign
affairs and on his power as Commander in Chief of the armed forces.
Although the court was aware of the serious impact release of the clas-
sified study might have on national security, it held that the President's
action was prohibited by the first amendment's rule against prior re-
straints, especially in the absence of any congressional authorization
for the President to seek such a restraint."
13
The Court's decisions in these cases rest upon the acknowledgment
that presidential power to act in foreign affairs without congressional
authorization exists only where constitutional rights are in no way
abridged. Furthermore, the Court is very reticent to construe statutes
to give the executive branch power to infringe upon individual liberties,
even when the Executive's foreign affairs power is implicated.14
The court of appeals in Narenji suggested an exception to this gen-
eral limitation on the power of the Executive over foreign affairs: 51
though the President is barred from using his foreign affairs power to
curtail the constitutional rights of citizens, 16 he nonetheless shares
power with Congress to curtail the constitutional rights of aliens. The
ensuing discussion will demonstrate that this exception does not exist.
11. Id. at 644-51 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also the concurring opinion of Justice
Douglas which states: "If we sanctioned the present exercise of power by the President, we
would be expanding Article II of the Constitution and rewriting it to suit the political
conveniences of the present emergency." Id. at 632 (Douglas, J., concurring).
112. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
113. Id. at 714, 732-33 (White, J., concurring), 742-46 (Marshall, J., concurring).
114. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), discussed at note 85 supra. In Kent, the
Court held that without a clear congressional delegation of authority, the Secretary of State
did not have the power to restrict individual liberties guaranteed by the fifth amendment,
even though the foreign affairs power of the executive branch was implicated in his decision
to deny issuance of a passport.
115. "Distinctions on the basis of nationality may be drawn in the immigration field by
the Congress or the Executive." 617 F.2d at 747.
116. See notes 106-14 supra and accompanying text.
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E. Extent of Presidential Power Over Immigration
The broadest language used by the Supreme Court in defining the
respective powers of the legislative and executive branches over immi-
gration is found in Knauff v. Shaughnessy."7 In Knauff, the Court con-
sidered whether an act of Congress, giving the executive branch
authority to exclude an alien from entry into the United States without
a hearing during wartime, was an unconstitutional delegation of legis-
lative power.11 8 In upholding the constitutionality of the legislative
delegation, the Court stated:
The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty.
The right to do so stems not alone from legislative power but
is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs
of the nation. When Congress prescribes a procedure con-
cerning the admissibility of aliens, it is not dealing alone with
a legislative power. It is implementing an inherent executive
power.
Thus the decision to admit or to exclude an alien may be
lawfully placed with the President, who may in turn delegate
the carrying out of this function to a responsible executive of-
ficer of the sovereign, such as the Attorney General. The ac-
tion of the executive officer under such authority is final and
conclusive. 119
While the Court recognized the exclusion of aliens as a power in-
herent in the Executive, it stated that this power "may be lawfully
placed with the President,"' 20 thereby implying that however inherent
the executive power over immigration, it must first be authorized by
Congress.
Fortunately, determination of this issue does not rest upon inter-
pretation of the preceding passages. Three years after Knauff, the
Court clarified its position in Galvin v. Press:'2 '
Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to re-
main here are peculiarly concerned with the political conduct
of government. In the enforcement of these policies, the Exec-
117. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
118. 22 U.S.C. § 223 (1979) (this citation is to the Act as it then existed).
119. 338 U.S. at 542-43 (citations omitted).
120. id. at 543.
121. 347 U.S. 522 (1954). In Galvin, the Court upheld the validity of § 22 of the Internal
Security Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781, 785 (1951), which required that the plaintiff, an alien
resident of long standing, be deported because of his past membership in the Communist
Party.
1981]
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utive Branch of the Government must respect the procedural
safeguards of due process. But that the formulation of these
policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about
as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial issues of our
body politic as any aspect of our government.
122
The court of appeals in Narenji cited Mathews v. Diaz 1 3 to sup-
port its proposition that "[d]istinctions on the basis of nationality may
be drawn in the immigration field by the Congress or the Executive."'124
In Mathews, as well as in the cases which followed it,"2 5 the Court used
broad language when denoting the power of the legislative and execu-
tive branches to draw distinctions between classes of aliens based on
nationality. It is important to note, however, that in each of these cases
the Court was speaking of executive power within the context of either
a legislative enactment, or a delegation of legislativepower to the execu-
tive branch.
In Mathews, the Court recognized that decisions in the area of im-
migration necessarily affect foreign relations and are, therefore, more
appropriately left to the legislature or to the Executive than to the judi-
ciary. It was for this reason that the Court observed that "[a]ny rule of
constitutional law that would inhibit the flexibility of the political
branches of government' to respond to changing world conditions
should be adopted only with the greatest caution."' 26 The Mathews
Court was considering a congressional enactment. Nowhere did the
Court state or imply that the Executive, acting without congressional
authorization, could act in the area of immigration under his foreign
affairs power.
The court of appeals in Narenji also cited iallo v. Bell' 27 to sup-
port this proposition. In Fiallo, the Supreme Court considered the con-
stitutionality of a congressional enactment which had the effect of
excluding illegitimate children or the natural fathers of illegitimate
children from the "special preference" immigration status accorded to
alien "children" or "parents" of United States citizens or lawful perma-
122. Id. at 531 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Accord, Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,
342 U.S. 580, 586-87 (1952); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893).
123. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
124. 617 F.2d at 747.
125. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976). See also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787 (1977). For further discussion of these cases, see notes 127-30 and 131-34 infra and
accompanying text.
126. 426 U.S. at 81.
127. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
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nent residents.1 2  The Fiallo Court cited Mathews in support of the
policy of limited judicial scrutiny of congressional enactments in the
field of immigration. 29 It was in this context that the Court in Fallo
quoted Mathews for the proposition that decisions in the area of immi-
gration are more appropriately left to the legislative or executive
branches than to the judiciary.1
3 0
The language of Mathews and Fallo is admittedly broad, and
somewhat vague, when read with the hope of cementing the delineation
between the respective powers of Congress and the Executive over im-
migration. A fair reading of these cases in light of their facts, however,
limits the application of this language to instances where Congress has
enacted specific legislation curtailing the rights of aliens, or where it
has delegated the authority to do so to the Executive. Further support
for this conclusion is found in the recent case of Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong.' 3 ' In Hampton, the Supreme Court held that a regulation
promulgated by the Civil Service Commission which discriminated be-
tween aliens and citizens exceeded the Commission's authority. While
the Court found that Congress had delegated to the Executive its au-
thority to issue the regulation, 32 and the Executive had, in turn, dele-
gated his authority to the Commission, it ruled that there was no
legitimate basis for presuming that the rule was intended to serve any
"overriding national interest" promoted by the Commission. 113  The
Court did imply, however, that the Executive, pursuant to the authority
vested in him by Congress, could issue the same regulation based on
"overriding national interests" protected by the Executive.' 34
128. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1l01(b)(1)(D), 1101(b)(2) (1976).
129. 430 U.S. at 796.
130. Id.
131. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
132. For a detailed discussion of the Court's opinion, see Hampton on remand, 435 F.
Supp. 37, 42 (N.D. Cal. 1977). For purpose of comparison with the immigration statutes at
issue, note the language of the statutes which the Court interpreted as delegating to the
President sufficient authority to exclude aliens from the civil service.
5 U.S.C. § 3301 (1976) provides, in its entirety, as follows: The President may-
(1) prescribe such regulations for the admission of individuals into the civil serv-
ice in the executive branch as will best promote the efficiency of that service;
(2) ascertain the fitness of applicants as to age, health, character, knowledge, and
ability for the employment sought; and
(3) appoint and prescribe the duties of individuals to make inquiries for the pur-
pose of this section.
5 U.S.C. § 3302 (1976) provides in part as follows:
The President may prescribe rules governing the competitive service. The rules
shall provide, as nearly as conditions of good administration warrant, for-
(1) necessary exceptions of positions from the competitive service . ...
133. 426 U.S. at 114-17.
134. Pursuant to the Court's dicta in Hampton, President Ford, on September 2, 1976,
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There is language in Hampton which might support the argument
that the Executive's power to promulgate the regulation is commensu-
rate with that of Congress. Thus, the Court stated that "[wle proceed to
a consideration of [whether the Commission's regulation is valid], as-
suming, without deciding, that the Congress and the President have the
constitutional power to impose the requirement that the Commission
has adopted."13 In looking at the context in which this language arose,
however, it is apparent that the Court was again dealing with a statute
which specifically delegated to the President the requisite authority to
promulgate the regulation. Pursuant to this statute, both Congress and
the President could be assumed to have commensurate constitutional
authority to issue the regulation.
In light of the Court's watchdog policy over attempts by the execu-
tive branch to step beyond its constitutional boundaries, 136 and the
Court's firm delineation of those boundaries in the field of immigra-
tion, 137 it is highly questionable that the Court would overturn its own
precedent and hold that the Constitution has given the Executive power
to act unilaterally in immigration matters without expressly so stating.
Because neither Congress nor the Constitution has conferred upon the
executive branch power to promulgate a rule discriminating against
aliens on the basis of nationality, regulation 214.5 was invalid as an
unauthorized encroachment by the executive branch over powers re-
served exclusively to Congress by the Constitution.
F. Justiciability of Narenji Under the Political Question Doctrine
After finding that Congress had delegated to the Attorney General
sufficient power to promulgate regulation 214.5, the court of appeals
refused to subject the regulation to judicial scrutiny due to the Execu-
under the authority vested in him by 5 U.S.C. §§ 3301 and 3302, ordered that the same
regulation be added to the Civil Service Code. Executive Order 11,935, 41 Fed. Reg. 37,301
(1976). It is important to note that the President relied upon the authority vested in him by
Congress in issuing the regulation (not upon his own inherent power) and stated as justifica-
tion for his order the same national interests which the Hampton Court indicated would be
adequate justification for a presidential order. On Hampton's remand to the district court,
the President's order was held to be constitutional. Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 435 F.
Supp. 37 (N.D. Cal. 1977). The Ninth Circuit has recently affirmed the district court's rul-
ing, Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1980). The Seventh Circuit has
also held that the Presidential order is constitutional. Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281
(7th Cir. 1978).
135. 426 U.S. at 114.
136. See notes 106-14 supra and accompanying text.
137. See notes 121-22 supra and accompanying text.
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tive's power over foreign affairs.' 38 It is now necessary to consider
whether the regulation's constitutionality was, in fact, justiciable.
In Baker v. Carr,'39 the Supreme Court set forth the test for deter-
mining whether a case involving a political question was outside the
realm of inquiry by the federal courts."o Factors which the Court con-
sidered important were: 1) whether the Constitution had committed
the issue to a coordinate political branch, 2) whether there were judi-
cial standards for resolving the issue, 3) whether resolution of the issue
required an initial policy determination inappropriate to the judiciary,
4) whether the court's independent resolution of the issue would in-
fringe on the powers accorded coordinate branches of the government,
5) whether there is an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to
the government's decision, and 6) whether embarrassment might result
from the judiciary's independent resolution of the issue.141
Matters concerning immigration have been confined explicitly to
the legislative branch by the Constitution. 142 However, due to the need
to protect rights accorded to aliens by the Constitution, the Court has
set forth "judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolv-
ing" the constitutionality of legislative enactments and federal regula-
tions in the field of immigration. 43 Moreover, Narenji was a case
which could have been decided "without an initial policy determina-
tion of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion."'" Narenji did not call
for a determination of whether the President's foreign policy toward
Iran was appropriate. It called, rather, for a determination of whether
138. 617 F.2d at 748.
139. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In Baker, the Court held that a challenge to a state statute
which apportioned the seats in the Tennessee General Assembly among the state's ninety-
five counties presented a justiciable constitutional issue.
140. In introducing its discussion of the political question doctrine the Court explained:
The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separa-
tion of powers. Much confusion results from the capacity of the 'political question'
label to obscure the need for case-by-case inquiry. Deciding whether a matter has
in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of govern-
ment, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been
committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a re-
sponsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.
Id. at 210-11.
141. Id. at 217.
142. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
143. 369 U.S. at 217. Thus, legislative enactments regarding immigration are subject to
judicial scrutiny under the "wholly irrational" test set forth in Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67
(1976). See notes 56-68 supra and accompanying text. Federal regulations issued under a
congressional delegation of authority are subject to judicial scrutiny under the "legitimate
basis" test as set forth in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976). See notes 131-34
supra and accompanying text.
144. 369 U.S. at 217.
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the presidential directive unconstitutionally abridged the rights of Ira-
nian nonimmigrant students within the United States. The Court has
not avoided considering the constitutionality of presidential directives
based on foreign affairs concerns in the past. 145 As the Court stated in
Baker: "[I]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy which
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."
' 146
The Supreme Court has recognized both the extraordinary power
of the President over foreign affairs and of Congress over immigration.
However, it has not considered scrutinizing presidential and legislative
enactments in these areas to constitute disrespect for the coordinate
branches of government, when upholding its own mandate to protect
individuals against the abridgment of their constitutional rights.
147
Furthermore, presidential policy decisions taken in time of war or na-
tional emergency frequently give rise to the need for unquestioning ad-
herence to presidential decisions. Yet, however great this need may
seem, it has not kept the Court from examining presidential directives
which have abridged constitutionally guaranteed rights in the past. 148
It is also true that whenever the courts question a presidential decision
there exists the potential for embarrassment. Again, this has not kept
the Court from examining presidential decisions which pose serious
constitutional questions.1
49
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals itself has rec-
ognized the responsibility of the federal judiciary to protect aliens' fifth
amendment rights against encroachment by the political branches of
government.' 50 It is with this same recognition that the court should
145. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); notes 106-11
supra and accompanying text. See also New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971); notes 112-13 supra and accompanying text.
146. 369 U.S. at 211.
147. See note 145 supra.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Han-Lee Mao v. Brownell, 207 F.2d 142 (D.C. Cir. 1953). In Brownell, the court
held that an executive officer cannot detain in this country an alien lawfully resident herein
without first giving him a chance to be heard on the questions involving his right to leave.
The court considered the issue ofjusticiability and stated:
Courts ordinarily regard it as beyond their province to interfere with the exercise of
what has been aptly called the 'peculiarly political' sovereign power of the United
States to deal with aiens... . But, as the Court [has been] careful to imply, gov-
ernmental policy toward aliens is not wholly immune from judicial power. The
political branches of government cannot deny the protection of the Fifth Amend-
ment to an alien who is entitled to invoke it.
Id. at 145-46 (footnotes omitted).
Although the plaintiff in Brownell was a lawful resident alien, it should be noted that
the fifth amendment protection extends to "[e]ven one whose presence in this country is
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have approached Narenji. 5
Had the Narenji court found that Congress had not delegated suf-
ficient authority to the Attorney General to issue regulation 214.5, it
would have been necessary for it to determine whether the regulation
constituted an unconstitutional encroachment by the executive branch
upon legislative powers. This question, like that of the regulation's
constitutionality under the fifth amendment, is justiciable.
In Buckley v. Valeo, 52 the Supreme Court determined that the leg-
islature had stepped outside the bounds of its own constitutional pow-
ers and into those reserved to the executive branch of government. The
Court noted that it had never hesitated, in the past, "to enforce the
principle of separation of powers embodied in the Constitution when
its application [had] prove[n] necessary for the decisions of cases or
controversies properly before it.' 5 3 It is, therefore, apparent that the
court of appeals in Narenji could have determined the regulation's con-
stitutionality had it so chosen.
unlawful, involuntary, or transitory." Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 77, see notes 56-67
supra and accompanying text.
151. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), which
the Supreme Court held to be nonjusticiable, due to the need to consider the President's
conduct in foreign affairs and the extent to which Congress may negate such conduct, is
distinguishable from Narenji. In Goldwater, the Court was asked to determine whether the
President had power to terminate a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan without express con-
gressional ratification. For a more detailed report of the facts in Goldwater, see the court of
appeals opinion at 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). The Court based
its finding of nonjusticiability on the "purely external" impact of the President's action. The
Court distinguished Goldwater from Youngstown, noting that Youngstown involved a presi-
dential decision which would have drastic internal, not merely external, impact. The Court
also noted that Goldwater involved "a dispute between coequal branches of our Govern-
ment, each of which has resources available to protect and assert its interests, resources not
available to private litigants outside the judicial forum." 444 U.S. at 1004 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (footnote omitted). Thus, the grounds upon which the Goldwater Court based
its finding of nonjusticiability cannot be found in Narenji, due to the domestic impact of the
President's order and the lack of alternative resources available to plaintiffs outside the judi-
cial forum.
152. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). In Buckley, the Court considered the constitutional-
ity of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974. The Court held that
Congress did not have sufficient constitutional power to authorize the Commission (which it
had appointed to carry out the provisions of the Act) to exercise broad administrative and
enforcement powers. Id. at 137-41. The Court considered these powers and stated that,
"none of them operates merely in aid of congressional authority to legislate or is sufficiently
removed from the administration and enforcement of public law to allow it to be performed
by the present Commission." Id. at 141.
153. Id. at 123 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88
(1952); United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1852); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 409 (1792)).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In order for the executive branch of government to abrogate the
constitutional rights afforded to aliens, it must first possess the author-
ity to do so. Neither Congress nor the Constitution has conferred such
power upon the President or the Attorney General. That Congress has
reserved for itself substantive policy decisions in the area of immigra-
tion refutes the contention that it would delegate such authority to the
Attorney General without expressly so stating. Furthermore, the Presi-
dent, in exercising his foreign affairs power, is subject to constitutional
restraints. The Supreme Court has seriously appraised the conflict be-
tween the need for executive expediency in foreign affairs and the need
to protect individual rights, and has concluded that the foreign affairs
power cannot be used to justify presidential orders which abridge con-
stitutional rights.
The federal judiciary has been ever diligent in upholding its con-
stitutional mandate to protect individual rights. In so doing, it has had
to remain aloof from the storm of public emotion in the greater interest
of preserving public freedom. That the court of appeals has failed to
do so here leaves the tenure and constitutional protections afforded to
aliens dubious at best, and disrupts the balance of power between the
three branches of our democratic government.
Heather A. Houston
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